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The Power of Definition: Brazil’s 
Contribution to Universal Concepts of 
Indigeneity 
JAN HOFFMAN FRENCH*
ABSTRACT
This article builds on discussions about the potential benefits and 
difficulties with developing a universal definition of indigenous peoples. 
It explores the spaces made available for theorizing indigeneity by the 
lack of a definition in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007. Specifically, this article addresses 
the challenge presented by the diversity of groups claiming indigenous 
status in Brazil. To what extent do distinct cosmologies and languages 
that mark Amazonian Indians as unquestionably indigenous affect 
newly recognized tribes in the rest of Brazil who share none of the indicia 
of authenticity? This article theorizes how to situate these newly 
recognized tribes within the context of the Declaration and addresses 
what the Brazilian experience has to offer in providing openings for 
claims that might have been made through alternative means, such as 
land reform and international cultural heritage rights. 
INTRODUCTION
In my recent book, Legalizing Identities: Becoming Black or Indian 
in Brazil's Northeast,1 I analyzed the process by which groups of black 
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rural workers were reconstituting themselves in relation to their strand 
of indigenous ancestry and were being recognized as Indians by the 
Brazilian government.2 Brazil is known as a place where indigenous 
peoples are exemplified by non-European languages, cosmologies, 
rituals, dress, and preconquest histories. However, over the past few 
decades, Brazil has been pioneering a broadening of the concept of 
indigenous peoples to include people previously assumed to be fully 
assimilated into the nation’s general population. In fact, over the past 
thirty years, the Brazilian government has recognized more than forty 
new “tribes” in the Northeast region alone.3 During that same period, 
many other presumably assimilated people demanded and received both 
recognition and access to land as Indians in other parts of eastern 
Brazil, including the state of Rio de Janeiro.4
These new Indians exist within a larger, flexible, international 
context of indigenous peoples made available for theorizing indigeneity 
by the lack of definition in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration).5 To what extent do distinct 
cosmologies and languages that unquestionably mark Amazonian 
groups, such as the Warí, Xavante, or Kayapo, as indigenous affect 
newly recognized tribes in the rest of Brazil who share none of these 
indicia of authenticity? Is it conceptually defensible from both an ethical 
and legal perspective of justice to include in a single category both 
people who have a clear claim to “difference” and have struggled for 
generations to gain even limited political autonomy, and those who have 
just recently discovered their claim to indigeneity under an expansive 
view of indigenous peoples?
This article is divided into three sections. The first explains the 
construction of global indigenous identity through the extensive process 
                                                                                                     
 1. JAN HOFFMAN FRENCH, LEGALIZING IDENTITIES: BECOMING BLACK OR INDIAN IN 
BRAZIL'S NORTHEAST (2009). 
 2. “[I]n Brazil [the term] Indian has gone through phases of denigration and of 
regeneration. The indigenous movement of the 1970s and 1980s reappropriated the term 
and infused it with a substantial dose of political agency.” ALCIDA RITA RAMOS,
INDIGENISM: ETHNIC POLITICS IN BRAZIL 6 (1998). In fact, the use of the term has come to 
be considered a “dynamic element[] of struggle.” MARÍA ELENA GARCÍA, MAKING 
INDIGENOUS CITIZENS: IDENTITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MULTICULTURAL ACTIVISM IN PERU
27 (2005). 
 3. JOÃO PACHECO DE OLIVEIRA FILHO, ATLAS DAS TERRAS INDÍGENAS DO NORDESTE
(1993); Stephen G. Perz, et al., Contributions of Racial-Ethnic Reclassification and 
Demographic Processes to Indigenous Population Resurgence: The Case of Brazil, 43 LATIN 
AM. RES. REV. 7, 27 (2008). 
4. See generally JONATHAN W. WARREN, RACIAL REVOLUTIONS: ANTIRACISM AND 
INDIAN RESURGENCE IN BRAZIL (2001) (analyzing the processes of racial formation among 
“posttraditional Indians” at various sites in eastern Brazil). 
 5. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
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of negotiating and adopting the Declaration. Due to insurmountable 
difficulties in reaching agreement, a definition of indigenous peoples 
was simply excluded from the Declaration. What remains is an open-
ended concept to be interpreted contextually. This article takes the view 
that a definition of indigenous peoples in the Declaration would be 
counterproductive, thus supporting the decision made by the 
deliberating body. In the second section, I address the challenge that the 
failure to agree on a legal definition of indigenous peoples poses to 
anthropology, a field superbly positioned to analyze and assist in 
conceptualizing meanings of indigeneity. Therefore, it is argued that 
discussions of international legal definitions of indigeneity should be 
made integral to anthropological perspectives. The third section uses 
the Brazilian example to suggest both a temporal and a spatial 
construction of diaspora as a justification for a broadened perspective on 
indigeneity worldwide. In the Brazilian case, the definition of Indian 
enacted in 1973 performed the same function as the exclusion of a 
definition of indigenous peoples in the Declaration on an international 
level, an opening up of the criteria for claiming indigenous rights.
I. GLOBAL INDIGENOUS IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION
After over two decades of meetings and negotiations, the 
Declaration was adopted by the 61st General Assembly of the United 
Nations on September 13, 2007, establishing 
a universal framework of minimum standards for the 
survival, dignity, well-being and rights of the world's 
indigenous peoples. The Declaration addresses both 
individual and collective rights; cultural rights and identity; 
rights to education, health, employment, language, and 
others. It outlaws discrimination against indigenous 
peoples and promotes their full and effective participation 
in all matters that concern them. It also ensures their right 
to remain distinct and to pursue their own priorities in 
economic, social and cultural development. The Declaration 
explicitly encourages harmonious and cooperative relations 
between States and indigenous peoples.6
                                                                                                    
 6. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2010). 
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Although the Declaration is not a legally binding instrument, it is 
declaratory of customary international law.7 Even while the Declaration 
was in draft form, national courts began citing it in support of indigenous 
rights.8 After twenty-three years of negotiation, the Declaration was 
adopted by a vote of 143–4 with eleven abstentions.9 According to a U.N. 
press release, “countries voting against the Declaration (Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United States) said they could not support it because 
of concerns over provisions on self-determination, land and resources rights, 
and, among others, language giving indigenous peoples a right of veto over 
national legislation and State management of resources.”10 The twenty-
three year delay in adoption is attributable to two sticking points: the draft 
Declaration asserts the importance of self-determination of indigenous 
peoples,11 and the term “indigenous peoples” is not defined. The adoption of 
the Declaration was delayed for an additional year as a result of objections 
and proposed amendments by a group of African states.12 Their 
fundamental objections were the absence of a definition of indigenous 
peoples and the possible encouragement of internal ethnic groups to assert a 
right to self-determination and to secede from the state.13
                                                                                                    
 7. Paul Oldham & Miriam Anne Frank, ‘We the Peoples…’: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 24 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 5, 5 (Apr. 
2008). 
 8. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-
Determination and the United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 7, 23 (2008) 
(citing (Consol.) re Maya Land Rights, Claim Nos. 171-72, ¶ 131 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (Belize), 
available at http://www.belizelaw.org/supreme_court/judge_list/civil_judge_2007.html) 
(follow “Supreme Court Claims Nos. 171 and 172 of 2007 (Consolidated) re Maya land 
rights” hyperlink). 
 9. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted against the 
Declaration. Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine abstained. Press Release, General 
Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major 
Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President, U.N. Press Release 
GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter G.A. Press Release]. 
 10. Id.
 11. See generally Daes, supra note 8, at 8 (describing the author’s (who was the 
principal drafter of the Declaration) belief that there is an intrinsic link between self-
identification and self-determination); Andrea Muehlebach, What Self in Self-
Determination? Notes from the Frontiers of Transnational Indigenous Activism, 10 
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUD. CULTURE & POWER 241 (2003) (describing how transnational 
indigenous activists are shaping the development of the concept of self-determination) 
[hereinafter Muehlebach, Self-Determination].
 12. The three African states that delayed the final vote were Botswana, Namibia, and 
Nigeria. 
 13. See Draft Aide Memoire, African Group, United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous People paras. 2.0-5.0 (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://www.ipacc.org. 
za/uploads/docs/Africanaidememoire.pdf. After further negotiations, all of the African 
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The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), a 
nongovernmental organization, estimates that “[t]here are over 370 
million indigenous people in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the 
Pacific.”14 However, the concept of indigenous peoples encoded in the 
Declaration is left undefined.15 In the absence of an agreement on a 
definition, the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples 
(WGIP)16 and the inter-sessional Working Group on the draft 
Declaration17 asserted that an explicit definition of indigenous peoples 
would reduce the effectiveness of the Declaration, which should, it was 
argued, hinge primarily on self-identification. For example, most 
definitions that were considered and rejected required that people show 
direct descent from an identifiable group of people inhabiting the same 
place as the group claiming indigenous rights before it was colonized. It 
was feared that this requirement of “firstness,” would exclude groups in 
Africa and Asia. Another problematic requirement was one in which 
cultural practices or a distinct language must be retained from the 
distant past. This would have excluded groups that were forced to 
                                                                                                     
countries voted in favor of the Declaration; Burundi, Kenya, and Nigeria abstained. G.A. 
Press Release, supra note 9. 
 14. Int’l Work Grp. for Indigenous Aff. [IWGIA], Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp (last visited Oct.17, 2010). Their 
inclusion criteria can also be found on their website. IWGIA, Identification of Indigenous 
Peoples: Indigenous Peoples-Who are They?, http://www.iwgia.org/sw641.asp (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2010). The International Labour Organization confirms that “[i]ndigenous and 
tribal peoples constitute at least 5,000 distinct peoples with a population of more than 370 
million, living in 70 different countries.” ILO, Nicaragua Ratifies ILO Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.ilocarib.org. 
tt/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1411&Itemid=368. 
 15. See Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, at 4-7, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328, U.N. Sales 
No. 09.VI.13 (2009) (explaining the decision to exclude a definition). 
 16. The United Nations Economic and Social Council established the WGIP as a 
“transnational locality” (in the sense that a new political space was created) in 1982. See
Andrea Muehlebach, ‘Making Place’ at the United Nations: Indigenous Cultural Politics at 
the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 415, 
415-16 (2001) (“It is the only global institution at which indigenous identity has for years 
been discussed.”) [hereinafter Muehlebach, Cultural Politics]. 
 17. In 1995, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights established the inter-
sessional Working Group with “the sole purpose of elaborating a draft declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples.” Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Working 
Group on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/groups/groups-02.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2010). That same year, the General Assembly decided that the “United Nations 
Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations should also be used to assist representatives 
of indigenous communities and organizations authorized to participate in the 
deliberations of the Working Group on the draft declaration.” Id.
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assimilate but are now dedicated to reconstituting group identity as 
indigenous.18
Most discussions of the Declaration begin with the working 
definition of indigenous proposed by U.N. Special Rapporteur José 
Martínez-Cobo in his Study of the Problem of Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations, which states:  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion 
and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations 
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as 
the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.19
The WGIP bore this definition in mind as negotiations proceeded 
but did not adopt it.20 Moreover, although there is a definitional 
provision in the International Labour Organization (ILO) International 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 of 1989, which has been 
ratified by twenty-one countries,21 the indigenous negotiators insisted 
                                                                                                    
 18. For example, the Mashpee Indians in Massachusetts were only recently granted 
federal recognition after decades of appealing a 1980s court decision that found they had 
not proven historical continuity or distinct cultural practices traceable to specific 
ancestors from the same place. See JAMES CLIFFORD, Identity in Mashpee, in THE
PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART
277 (1988). See also Andrew Ryan, Mashpee Tribe Wins Federal Recognition, BOS. GLOBE,
Feb. 16, 2007 at B8 (for information on the 2007 federal recognition). 
 19. Special Rapporteur on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, Final Rep. on the Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, para. 379, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (Sept. 30, 1983) (by José R. Martínez Cobo). According to 
Erica-Irene Daes, this definition has been unofficially used in certain cases. Special 
Rapporteur on the Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Final Rep. on the 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, para. 18, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (June 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes). 
 20. PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2002). 
 21. In 1989, ILO Convention No. 169 was adopted with the following provision in 
Article 1:  
1. This Convention applies to: 
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that anything short of self-identification would not provide the 
flexibility needed for an inclusive and self-determining process of 
recognition. 
Components of both the Martínez-Cobo and ILO definitions were 
problematic from the perspective of self-identification. For example, in 
the Martínez-Cobo definition, the phrase “historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories” 
presented the problem of excluding peoples living in nonsettler societies, 
along with displaced and diasporic indigenous peoples.22 Another 
example is the 2006 U.S. proposal to the Working Group on the Draft 
Declaration, which illustrates just how limiting the effort to pin down a 
definition can be. The U.S. proposal was rejected by the drafters, but it 
would have required state recognition prior to U.N. recognition:   
                                                                                                     
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and 
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the 
national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially 
by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous 
on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or 
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the 
provisions of this Convention apply. 
ILO: Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 
1, paras. 1-2, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). Nicaragua is 
the most recent country to ratify the Convention, bringing the number to 21. ILO, 
Nicaragua Ratifies ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (Aug. 
30, 2010), WWW.ILO.ORG, http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/portal/index.php?option=com_content& 
task=view&id=1411&Itemid=368. 
 22. Martínez-Cobo, supra note 19, at para. 379; see also James Clifford, Varieties of 
Indigenous Experience: Diasporas, Homelands, Sovereignties, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE 
TODAY 197 (Marisol de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007) (exploring the diversity of 
claims to indigeneity and arguing for their legitimacy). In this article, I am not directly 
addressing the issue of connection to land as a defining factor for indigeneity in the 
Declaration. The tension between a definition that focuses on social and cultural identity 
and one that is primarily about territory is reflected in the Declaration. Right to land 
“which [indigenous peoples] have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used” is 
enshrined in Article 26, along with a directive to States to “give legal recognition and 
protection to these lands.” Declaration, supra note 5, art. 26, paras. 1, 3. However, claim to 
land or connection to territory is not a prerequisite for coverage by the Declaration. For 
example, “historic injustices” are seen as resulting from “inter alia, their colonization and 
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources.” Id. annex (emphasis added). 
Cultural protection and self-determination are accorded more space in the Declaration 
than land issues. 
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Indigenous peoples have the right to be recognized as 
such by the State through a transparent and reasonable 
process. When recognizing indigenous peoples States 
should include a variety of factors, including, but not 
limited to . . . whether the group . . . self-identifies as 
indigenous; . . . is comprised of descendants of persons 
who inhabited a geographic area prior to the sovereignty 
of the State; . . . historically had been sovereign; . . . 
maintains a distinct community and aspects of 
governmental structure; . . . has a cultural affinity with 
a particular area of land or territories; . . . has distinct 
objective characteristics such as language, religion, 
culture; and, . . . has been historically regarded and 
treated as indigenous by the State.23   
Evident from this proposal is the influence of the U.S. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs requirements that have restricted federal recognition for 
many groups over the years.24 Such a definition, it was felt by the 
drafters, would have been impractical in a transnational context. The 
indigenous participants viewed the lack of a definition of indigenous 
peoples as impractical and equivalent to a refusal to use the “language 
understood by those wielding power.”25 Indigenous representatives in 
WGIP meetings in the 1990s expressed the view that unless a “law 
reaches out to the varieties of human existence,” it should be considered 
deficient.26 They also asserted that for a law to be morally valid, “it 
must have the consent of . . . those affected”27 by its provisions.  
Self-identification, although fundamental to the recognition of 
indigenous peoples on the international level, is not the only criterion 
important to indigenous representatives, as “[i]ndigenous peoples are 
                                                                                                    
 23. Chairperson-Rapporteur on the ESCOR, Comm’n H.R., Report of the Working 
Group on the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27-29, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79 (Mar. 22, 2006) (by Luis-Enrique Chávez). In June, the Obama 
administration announced that the United States would review its position on the 
Declaration. Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Review of the U.N. Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (June 4, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 
2010/06/142662.htm. 
 24. E.g., CLIFFORD, supra note 18 (describing the history of Massachusetts’ Mashpee 
Indians and their 1976 lawsuit claim for land, which was ultimately unsuccessful because 
they did not meet the “tribal” criteria). 
 25. Justin Kenrick & Jerome Lewis, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and the Politics of the 
Term ‘Indigenous’, 20 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 4, 9 (Apr. 2004). 
 26. THORNBERRY, supra note 20, at 10 (2002) (quoting ANDREW LINKLATER, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE POST-
WESTPHALIAN ERA 96 (1998)). 
 27. Id.
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not only those who say they are indigenous but also those who are 
accepted by a global network of nations and communities with similar 
claims and sources of recognition.”28 Therefore, both self-identification 
and other-identification are critical to public recognition. There is little 
doubt that the decision to leave the concept open and flexible has 
contributed to the expansion of the number of groups who self-identify 
and who are recognized as indigenous by the United Nations and other 
international bodies. It has also encouraged the growing identification 
of indigenous activists, representatives, and intellectuals with a global 
indigenous identity that has influenced the actions of international and 
state entities.29 Such a global indigenous identity allows groups to “gain 
voice through cross-national connections that empower their approach 
to national dilemmas.”30 Moreover, this global indigenous identity does 
not adhere to international actors alone, but is crucial to self-
identification by local peoples in settings ranging from the Sami people 
in northern Europe to the San people in southern Africa.31
                                                                                                    
 28. RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY 22, 227 n.21 (2003) (reporting a definition proposed by indigenous delegates). 
In the United States, the assumption of solidarity among indigenous peoples is not a 
given. For example, the leadership of the Eastern Band of Cherokee opposes federal 
recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe in North Carolina. See, e.g., Lumbees Clash with 
Cherokee at Senate Hearing, INDIANZ.COM, (July 13, 2006), http://64.38.12.138/News/ 
2006/014928.asp.; Senators Seek Lumbee Recognition, NEWSOBSERVER.COM, (Oct. 10, 2009, 
2:08 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2009/10/01/121289/senators-seek-lumbee 
recognition.html#storylink=misearch. 
 29. See, e.g., NIEZEN, supra note 28 (discussing the indigenism movement as a new 
global political entity and providing a history of the movement’s relationships with states 
and international bodies); Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Rights and the Collective 
Conscious, 18 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 2002, at 1, 2-3; Daes, supra note 8, at 8-11; 
Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, 4-9; Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in 
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
414, 414-15, 417-26 (1998); Muehlebach, Self-Determination, supra note 11, at 244-46, 
254-56, 261-63; Muehlebach, Cultural Politics, supra note 16 (describing the WGIP’s role 
in the transnational indigenous movement); Oldham & Frank, supra note 7 (giving a 
detailed account of the Declaration’s adoption and the history of its drafting and status as 
a resolution); Viniyanka Prasad, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Flexible Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 297, 311-15 (2009). But see Michaela Pelican, Complexities of Indigeneity and 
Autochthony: An African Example, 36 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 52 (2009) (describing several 
examples of how countries have ignored global indigenism or used it to harm those the 
movement intended to protect). 
 30. Anna Tsing, Indigenous Voice, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE TODAY 33, 57 (Marisol 
de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007). 
 31. See Dorothy L. Hodgson, Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on the Indigenous 
Rights Movement in Africa and the Americas, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1037, 1039-40 
(2002). 
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The trend toward an expansive definition of indigenous peoples 
began well before the Declaration was adopted and is directly linked to 
the increased participation of representatives from Africa and Asia 
(places that, until recently, were excluded from consideration as not 
having indigenous groups).32 As standard assumptions moved away 
from the notion that the existence of indigenous peoples were confined 
to settler societies, such as those in the Western Hemisphere, Australia, 
and New Zealand, an expanded perspective on the definition of 
indigeneity began to take hold in U.N. deliberations. The involvement of 
indigenous participants in deliberations and negotiations leading up to 
the Declaration’s adoption was unprecedented.33 In 1982, when the 
WGIP was established, only thirty representatives were present. In 
1999, nearly one thousand participants attended the WGIP meeting, 
creating a site of “discursive density.”34
The Global Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus, consisting of the group of 
indigenous delegates present at the WGIP meetings, would meet to 
discuss their positions on the issues at stake through intense debate 
and consensus decision making.35 Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson and 
Special Rapporteur of the WGIP from its founding until 2001 and 
principal drafter of the Declaration, explains that indigenous peoples 
were not part of original state building.36 This reminder makes the 
indigenous representation at every stage during the twenty-three year 
period of drafting, debating, and redrafting the Declaration even more 
impressive. Such participation contributed to the constitution of a 
supranational indigenous identification. Patrick Thornberry, 
international law scholar and an observer at WGIP meetings, described 
                                                                                                    
 32. U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, Trust Fund on Indigenous Issues 
Relating to the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/second_trustfund.html#2009 (last visited Oct. 9, 
2010). In May 2009, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, as 
advisor for projects for the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, 
proposed to award grants to nineteen projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Eurasia (a region covering Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central 
Asia, and Transcaucasia), North America, and the Pacific. 
 33. See Daes, supra note 8, at 12-18; see also Muehlebach, Self-Determination, supra
note 11 (discussing the increasingly visible presence of indigenous delegates in the 
international arena in a number of contexts); Oldham & Frank, supra note 7, at 6-8. 
 34. Muehlebach Cultural Politics, supra note 16, at 415, 420. 
 35. E.g., Oldham & Frank, supra note 7 (describing in detail the response of the 
Caucus to the African Group’s Draft Aide-Memoire). 
 36. See Daes, supra note 8, at 13. State-building is a reference to the process by which 
a nation is transformed into a nation-state with an independent government and laws. In 
Hispanic America, for example, creoles (descendants of colonizing Spaniards) were the 
primary group involved in state-building in the nineteenth century. Indigenous 
populations were excluded from the state-building project. 
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the meetings as “[a]rguments between government delegations and the 
indigenous [that] seemed interminable, their position statements 
incommensurable. But there was also a sense of something shifting, of 
ideas grinding their way through the morass of argument and rebuttal, 
storytelling and complaint.”37
While increased indigenous participation in the draft Declaration 
negotiations was crucial to its eventual adoption, there was also some 
concern that such participation was restricted to an upper echelon of 
indigenous delegates. Anthropologist Jonathan Friedman has argued 
the risk that class inequalities might be reinforced between delegates 
and the people at home whom they represent.38 He refers to the 
internationally active indigenous delegates as part of a “global cocktail 
circuit.”39 Over a decade ago, when Friedman made this comment, it 
may have been appropriate to be suspicious of claims to a global 
indigenous identity, both as a top-down imposition and as a distraction 
from studying local cultural specificities. Today, it is necessary to 
rethink such cautionary reactions because indigeneity and indigenous 
rights are commonly accepted notions that affect localities around the 
world. Generally, an anthropological approach to indigeneity would 
emphasize the specificities of particular groups, paying less attention to 
the impact of events at an international level (see section III below). 
However, some anthropologists, such as Mary Louise Pratt, are 
beginning to take a different approach and are criticizing the 
established anthropological wisdom by asserting that it should no longer 
be a given that “perform[ing] the always legitimating scholarly gesture 
of presenting complicated truth against . . . reductive ideology”40 is the 
only or best way to approach global indigenous identity. This still leaves 
the question of which foundational justifications for claims to 
indigenous rights are valid, particularly if self-identification has become 
the primary requirement on the international level. Once historical 
continuity, language and cultural practices, and blood quantum are no 
                                                                                                    
 37. THORNBERRY, supra note 20, at 10. See generally Noel Castree, Differential 
Geographies: Place, Indigenous Rights and 'Local' Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133, 161 
(2004) (exploring reasons why indigenous peoples should have the right “to make their 
own places rather than have them made for them.”). 
 38. Jonathan Friedman, Indigenous Struggles and the Discreet Charm of the 
Bourgeoisie, in PLACES AND POLITICS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 53, 64 (Roxann 
Prazniak & Arif Dirlik eds., 2001).  
 39. Id.
 40. Mary Louise Pratt, Afterword: Indigeneity Today, in INDIGENOUS EXPERIENCE 
TODAY 397, 400 (Marisol de la Cadena & Orin Starn eds., 2007). 
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longer required foundational justifications for the recognition of an 
indigenous people, it will be crucial to develop other justifications.41   
More capacious definitional possibilities allow peoples claiming 
indigeneity, such as international agencies and national governments, 
to consider other morally powerful justifications for such claims. In The
Moral Force of Indigenous Politics: Critical Liberalism and the 
Zapatistas, political scientist Courtney Jung provides an alternative 
analysis.42 She sees indigenous identity as a “political achievement,” not 
as “an accident of birth” or a “spontaneous global reaction in defense of 
cultural preservation.”43 Jung proposes a theory of political identity 
formation according to which “indigenous people are partly constituted 
as a potential group because they occupy a common location of 
structural exclusion from the modern state, not because they possess a 
common language or culture.”44 Recognition as indigenous should flow 
not from a notion of existential identity, but rather from what the larger 
society and state has done to the group over time—how the group has 
been treated by state institutions and majority populations.45 However, 
such a structural location does not by itself produce an indigenous 
rights movement. The concept of indigenous rights must first “develop[] 
sufficient traction to orient, and to open the political space for, 
indigenous politics.”46 Echoing such a perspective, anthropologist Mary 
Louise Pratt has observed that indigeneity should be viewed “not as a 
condition but [as] a force,” a “bundle of generative possibilities.”47 In my 
opinion, the political space referred to by Jung, together with Pratt’s 
notion of a “force,” are served by loosening definitional fetters and 
considering alternative justifications for indigenous self-identification 
and other-identification.48
                                                                                                    
 41. There has been a certain fetishization of firstness or priority of settlement with 
regard to identification of indigeneity around the world. However, a claim to being first in 
a particular place can be a double-edged sword. Indigenous rights, based on a claim to 
priority, may be used by those who are structurally in a relatively powerful, and even 
exploitative, position. See Adam Kuper, The Return of the Native, 44 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 389, 389 (2003). 
 42. COURTNEY JUNG, THE MORAL FORCE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS: CRITICAL 
LIBERALISM AND THE ZAPATISTAS (2008) (analyzing the shift from peasant to indigenous 
politics by the Zapatistas in Mexico).  
 43. Id. at 11, 20. 
 44. Id. at 69. 
 45. See id. at 33. 
 46. Id. at 69. 
 47. Pratt, supra note 40, at 400, 402. 
 48. As one Zapatista activist who was at first reluctant to embrace indigenous identity 
indicated to Jung, “his concern was never an existential one . . . . Instead, what he hoped 
was that indigenous identity would reconstitute the terms of struggle.” JUNG, supra note 
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II. ANTHROPOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has written on the contributions 
anthropology has made, and can make, to understanding international 
law.49 Merry's review of the literature has unearthed a number of 
contributions, particularly the component that shows how 
anthropological theory helps us understand “how international law is 
produced and how it works.”50 The inverse is also true. International 
legal definitional discussions, decisions, and contestations can greatly 
enhance anthropological thinking about indigeneity.  
A number of anthropologists evaluating definitional issues 
surrounding the terms indigenous peoples and indigeneity have 
concluded that such terms are not useful anthropological concepts from 
an analytical perspective because they are too essentializing, too tied to 
the land, or too broadly conceived.51 However, those same scholars 
condescendingly agree that, although such terms are not adequate for 
anthropological analysis, they are useful as legal concepts, as tools for 
political persuasion, or as meaningful terms “for those who identify 
themselves as indigenous.”52 Some take a slippery slope approach, 
arguing that the use of the concepts will inevitably lead to ethnic 
strife,53 while others distinguish between indigenism (an 
internationalist endeavor) and ethnonationalism, which rests on myths 
                                                                                                     
42, at 78. In other words, his reluctance was not based on his own conception of his 
personal identity, but stemmed from considerations of his political identity. 
 49. See Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 99, 100 (2006). 
 50. Id. at 9. “[A]nthropological research plays a critical role in examining how 
international law works in practice, mapping the circulation of ideas and procedures as 
well as examining the array of small sites in which international law operates . . . .” Id. at 
111. 
 51. See Kuper, supra note 41; Pelican, supra note 29, at 53. 
 52. Pelican, supra note 29, at 54; accord Alan Barnard, Kalahari Revisionism, Vienna 
and the 'Indigenous Peoples' Debate, 14 SOC. ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 7, 13 (2006). Pelican 
believes that “stripping the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ of its original connotations of 
priority in time and historical continuity is debatable.” Pelican, supra note 29, at 56. 
Pelican also discusses the relationship between Cameroon’s Grassfielders and Mbororo 
people as an example; the latter, despite being relative newcomers “locally perceived as 
strangers or allogènes, qualify on the international level as indigenous peoples.” Id. at 58. 
This leads me to raise the question of how much deference international agencies should 
give to local views (the United States’ desire to impose its definitional requirements is 
instructive). But see John Bowen, Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous 
Peoples' Rights? Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century, 16 
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12 (2000) (proposing an intermediate and alternative two-level 
analysis for determining indigeneity from an anthropological perspective). 
 53. See Friedman, supra note 38, at 397-99; Kuper, supra note 41, at 395; Pelican, 
supra note 29, at 61.
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of cultural purity and frequently involves movements that seek 
secession from the host nation-state.54
There is also a fear that encouraging collective indigenous rights 
might lead to abuses of individual human rights by a group uncontrolled 
by the state. This concern is often based on an assumed lack of 
democratic process in indigenous settings. However, indigenous groups 
are aware of concerns about potential abuses of individual rights and 
have begun to address this issue at an international level. The Manila 
Declaration of the International Conference on Conflict Resolution, 
Peace Building, Sustainable Development, and Indigenous Peoples, held 
in December 2000 with extensive indigenous participation, recognized 
justice as universal and acknowledged that a revitalization of traditions 
should not lead to oppression of women and children.55 Again, there is a 
risk of condescension in assuming that people who self-identify as 
indigenous are uninterested in or incapable of participating in a 
democratic process.56 There is no reason why international legal 
processes that call human rights violations into question cannot be 
applied to recognized indigenous groups.  
In fact, anthropologists are increasingly arguing against the notion 
that collective rights are intrinsically dangerous.57 Moreover, the notion 
of “culture,” as conceptualized by anthropologists, has shifted to an 
active process of self-making and production of identity. In the 
international indigenous rights context, a consensus is growing that 
such identity construction is central to “building global alliances to 
resist global processes of dispossession.”58 A number of legal scholars 
have begun to take the position that issues of representativeness and 
possible abuses of individual rights should neither be ignored nor 
                                                                                                    
 54. Noel Castree, Differential Geographies: Place, Indigenous Rights and 'Local' 
Resources, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 133, 152 (2004) (citing Ronald Niezen, Recognizing 
Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of Indigenous Peoples, 42 
COMP. STUD SOC’Y & HIST. 119, 120 (2000)). 
 55. International Conference on Conflict Resolution, Peace Building, Sustainable 
Development and Indigenous Peoples, December 6-8, 2000, Manila Declaration, pmbl., § 5, 
available at http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download 
&gid=40&Itemid=27 (describing the proceedings of a conference with ninety participants 
from indigenous communities on five continents, all of whom signed the declaration). 
 56. For many years, scholars of the Iroquois Confederacy ironically touted the myth 
that the U.S. Constitution and American democracy itself were based partially on the 
Iroquois example. This trend has shifted but not without Congress weighing in. In 1988, 
Congress passed a resolution acknowledging the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy 
of Nations to the development of the U.S. Constitution. See H.R. Con. Res. 331, 100th 
Cong. (1988), http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/hconres331.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2010). 
 57. See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 29, at 3; Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, at 5. 
 58. Kenrick & Lewis, supra note 25, at 9. 
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privileged when considering who should have collective indigenous 
rights, thus helping to allay fears of the violation of human rights of 
individuals who constitute part of the group.59
At the same time, most anthropologists dealing with these matters 
mention international law definitional discussions but do not 
incorporate such definitions into an anthropological consideration.60 For 
example, Alan Barnard equates indigenous peoples with other legal 
categories and insists that this phrase should not be “in our glossary of 
technical terms.”61 Barnard’s view is a shortsighted approach to a term 
that, since the 1970s, has become embedded in theoretical discussions at 
all levels. In other words, the term “indigenous peoples” is not simply an 
“ideological construct” or “a useful tool for political persuasion,” as 
suggested by Barnard.62 Accordingly, anthropologist Sidsel Saugestad 
has observed, “anthropologists writing about indigenous issues need to 
take heed of the codification of the concept taking place within the UN 
system . . . . If anthropologists want to reconceptualize ‘indigenous 
peoples,’ the point of departure must be this present use.”63
This approach also considers how the success of the global 
indigenous movement might affect the epistemological assumptions 
underlying anthropological definitions of indigeneity and indigenous 
peoples. Anthropologists are dedicated to specificities as the crux of 
much of their work, but a focus on specificity should not lead 
anthropologists to ignore the global framework of indigenous rights, 
including international legal considerations now accepted and utilized 
in local discourse and praxis.64 As groups around the world adopt the 
                                                                                                    
 59. See, e.g., Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations 
by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2006) (arguing that 
because the U.S. is subject to international human rights norms and American Indian 
tribes are a political subunit of the United States, the United States is responsible for 
violations of individual rights that take place on tribal lands and has an obligation to 
rectify such situations); Kingsbury, supra note 29, at 425-26; Luis Roniger, Citizenship in
Latin America: New Works and Debates, 10 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 489, 500-02 (2006). 
 60. See, e.g., Bowen, supra note 52 (arguing that the emphasis on prior occupation and 
universality in international law’s definitions is inadequate to fully satisfy considerations 
of equality and self-governance and proposing a more locally sensitive analytical 
framework instead). 
 61. Barnard, supra note 52, at 12. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. Sidsel Saugestad, Discussion, On the Return of the Native, 45 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 264 (2004). 
 64. Anthropologists who have confronted this crucial issue include JOANNE RAPPAPORT,
INTERCULTURAL UTOPIAS: PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS, CULTURAL EXPERIMENTATION, AND 
ETHNIC PLURALISM IN COLUMBIA 64-65 (2005); ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, FRICTION: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL CONNECTION 205-06 (2005); Tania Murray Li, Articulating 
Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Trial Slot, 42 COMP. STUD.
SOC’Y AND HIST. 149, 155-57, 169-70 (2000). 
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category of indigenous peoples as a claim to recognition, self-
conceptualization of indigenousness has become crucial to identity 
formation and visions of the future. Since the 1960s, when an 
epistemological shift took hold, sociocultural anthropologists have 
distinguished between how people being studied explain their practices 
and beliefs (called “emic” or folk explanations) and how anthropologists 
explain those same practices and beliefs (called “etic” or analytical 
explanations).65 This division, though important at the time it was 
theorized, should be reconsidered. Peoples’ use of the international 
discourse of indigenous rights places in question the accepted emic/etic 
and folk/analytical dichotomy. 
Emic and etic are merely two poles of a continuum in which varying 
degrees of self-definition are intertwined with what were previously 
purely analytical concepts, such as indigeneity. Just as the imbrications 
of global and local reveal transnational and translocal connections 
between international and local identities, it is critical that 
anthropologists not be dismissive of indigenous as an identity simply 
imposed from above, but rather as a process of self-identification. This 
provides an opening to consider in a different way the original question 
posed in this article: how to honor the long-term struggles for political 
autonomy and self-determination of unquestionably indigenous peoples 
in the eyes of the world, while at the same time expanding the 
definitional heft of indigeneity to encompass those who have come to 
self-identify as indigenous more recently. 
III. PRODUCTIVE CONTRADICTIONS
When considering a contradiction based on a presumed opposition, 
it is often productive to question that opposition, as proposed above 
regarding the emic/etic divide. James Clifford suggests reconsideration 
of the dichotomous “poles of autochthony (we are here and have been 
here forever) and diaspora (we yearn for a homeland).”66 Emphasizing 
the varieties of indigenous experience, he sees the displacement and 
migration of indigenous peoples as an “uneven, continuum of 
                                                                                                    
 65. See, e.g., PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV 4-6 (Oxford 
Univ. Press reprt. 1968) (1957); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-
30 (1973); MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY: A HISTORY OF 
THEORIES OF CULTURE 568-604 (Alta Mira Press updated ed. 2001) (1968); Stanley 
Diamond, Anthropology in Question, in REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 401, 423-25 (Dell 
Hymes ed., 1972); William S. Willis, Jr., Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet, in
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY, supra, at 121, 126-27. 
 66. Clifford, supra note 22, at 205. 
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attachments.”67 Examples include those who have moved to urban 
areas, as well as people who have been expelled or forced to move from 
their rooted places, all of whom are “improvising new ways to be 
native.”68
At this point, it is useful to return to the question first posed in this 
article, how to justify including in the single category of indigenous 
peoples both those who have a clear claim to difference and those who 
have only recently discovered they have a claim to indigeneity under an 
expansive view of indigenous peoples. In considering this question, it is 
fruitful to imagine how such new ways of being native as the result of 
displacement (to cities, for example) differ from the reconstitution of 
indigenous identity by people like those living in the Brazilian 
Northeast, who assert their identity without clear evidence of 
indigeneity. The first form of displacement is a movement through 
space. The second is a movement through time, where there has been a 
break in identification with an indigenous past. Both involve a yearning 
and desire for place, distant or immediate. Anthropologist Tom Biolsi 
has reviewed the varieties of “indigenous political space” in the United 
States and described it as one in which Indian people carry “portable 
rights beyond reservations” (more Indians live off than on a reservation, 
and primarily in urban areas). He analyzes this variety in relation to 
the diaspora concept and considers it a form of “indigenous 
cosmopolitanism” because its participants do not confine themselves to 
indigenous territory but situate themselves both physically and 
culturally throughout the national space.69
Under this analysis, time can stand in for space, thus allowing for a 
form of temporal diasporic indigeneity. Just as one might consider the 
notion of diasporic indigeneity as an alternative way to inhabit 
“indigenous political space,” a temporal diaspora might be an 
appropriate way to think about those who are reconstituting an 
indigenous identity. They base their reconstitution of identity on the 
presumed settlement in a particular place in centuries past. The “new” 
tribes in Brazil’s Northeast imagine their indigenous roots in a time 
before prior generations were decimated by disease, assimilationist 
policies, and Catholic Church resettlement of surviving members of 
distinct tribes to missions, where they were put to work on the Church’s 
land. The term remanescentes (translated variously as remnants, 
remainders, or descendants) was used to describe newly reconstituted 
                                                                                                    
 67. Id. at 215. 
 68. Id. at 198. 
 69. Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and 
American Indian Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239, 248-49 (2005). 
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indigenous groups in Brazil from the beginning of the renewal process.70
By recognizing these groups and providing them with land and rights as 
Indians, the Brazilian government is recognizing a previously 
unacknowledged link to a historical crime committed by the colonial 
authorities, the state, and the Catholic Church. This decision, made by 
both the state and the church,71 represents the recognition that a “claim 
to indigeneity is a claim to justice based not simply on historical priority 
but a sense of historical injustice”; such indigenous identities are 
“dynamic and processual and rooted in contemporary social relations, 
even as [people] invoke an historical perspective to make sense of who 
they are.”72 After all, it may be unjust, from a historical perspective, if 
the descendants of those who had their identity stolen are denied rights 
while those who happened to live beyond the reach of the colonial 
powers are unquestionably recognized as indigenous. 
Brazil’s solution to this potential injustice came about as an 
unintended consequence of the Indian Statute of 1973.73 Brazil’s 
military government, which ruled from 1964 to 1985, enacted this law to 
regularize property rights in the Amazon region to protect the country’s 
outer reaches from invasion by foreigners. The intention of the statute 
was to remove Indians from areas that could be developed and to place 
them in legally demarcated territories called reservas. Although this led 
to the disruption of many of the indigenous peoples in the Amazon, it 
also “broke political ground for Indians to stake their claims,” based on 
government recognition of the demarcated territories as dedicated to the 
Indians resettled there.74 As it turned out, that law not only helped 
Amazonian Indians in their demands for demarcation of lands and 
provision of resources, it also inadvertently provided an opening for 
                                                                                                    
 70. JOSÉ MAURÍCIO ARRUTI, MOCAMBO: ANTROPOLOGIA E HISTÓRIA DO PROCESSO DE 
FORMAÇÃO QUILOMBOLA 80 (2005). 
 71. In 1971, Bishops’ Councils of the Catholic Church in the Amazon and the Northeast 
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 72. Andrew Canessa, The Past Is Not Another Country: Exploring Indigenous Histories 
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previously unrecognized descendants of “reduced” Indian mission 
communities to demand their newly conceived rights as Indians and not 
simply remanescentes.   
In 1973, for the first time, the term “Indian” was legally defined in 
Article 3 of the Indian Statute as follows: “Indian or forest dweller is 
every individual of Pre-columbian origin and ancestry who identifies 
himself and is identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose cultural 
characteristics distinguish him from the national society.”75
Previously, indigenous people in Brazil were referred to as forest 
dwellers (silvícolas), with the assumption that there was no need to set 
out a definition since the only indigenous groups were isolated 
Amazonian tribes, each with its own language and cultural practices. 
Although the new definition in Article 3 codified an assimilationist 
perspective in following Article 4,76 it also allowed for those of “pre-
Columbian origin and ancestry” to identify themselves as Indian, so 
long as they were “identified as belonging to an ethnic group whose 
cultural characteristics distinguish [them] from the national society.”77
Within a decade of its enactment, Article 3 of the statute was being used 
independently of Article 4, which defined stages of acculturation and 
had taken on a life of its own. In practice, the origin and ancestry clause 
of Article 4 has been effectively broadened, in part because of the 
universal Brazilian belief that all rural people have some indigenous 
ancestry, along with African and Portuguese (and Dutch in the 
Northeast).78 Unlike the United States, African ancestry of an 
individual does not trump other ancestries, thus allowing each person 
certain flexibility in ethnoracial self-identification. In fact, the statute 
does not mention racial characteristics as a condition of Indian 
categorization. Paradoxically, in light of the spate of recognitions of 
peoples who could be classified as “integrated” under Article 4, it is 
precisely that article, with its potential and legally permissible 
transformation of ethnic Indians into non-Indians, which requires the 
origin and ancestry clause of Article 3 to be virtually ignored as a racial 
requirement. If some people can cease being Indians, there is no 
impediment for others to become Indians. In the twenty-five years since 
redemocratization, the assimilationist perspective has been rejected, 
                                                                                                    
 75. FRENCH, supra note 1, at 66-67. 
 76. Article 4 contains three classifications of indigenous communities: isolated, 
integrating, and integrated, reflecting the policy of the government at the time, which was 
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and indigenous people who move to the city are no longer stripped of 
their legal identities as Indians.79 With the newly recognized tribes, the 
overall indigenous population has increased dramatically.   
Illustrating the power of definition (or lack thereof), in the case of 
Brazil, adding a definition performed the same function as excluding a 
definition in the Declaration on an international level. Thus, with Brazil 
as one example of a broadened definition of indigenous peoples, the 
undefined term in the Declaration permits a range of groups existing 
along a spatial-temporal continuum to claim indigenous rights.80 In 
other words, the newly recognized, previously assimilated, northeastern 
Brazilian tribes; peoples in Africa and Asia who would not otherwise 
meet a definition that requires European colonization or “firstness” in 
time; and those, such as the Roma or Gypsies, who do not have a 
homeland (even an imagined one), can all claim indigeneity.  
CONCLUSION
So long as there is no restrictive definition, a group could be 
recognized as indigenous on an international level because indigeneity 
should be “sufficiently flexible to accommodate a range of justifications” 
and should not be about a list of characteristics or “firstness.”81 By 
looking at indigenous in terms of justifications, rather than 
characteristics, it might be possible to recognize as indigenous “groups 
[that] draw upon the international concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ in 
constructing their own identities.”82 In this way, groups “whose self-
concept might not have centered on prior possession may come to 
identify themselves as indigenous peoples with experiences and 
                                                                                                    
 79. The 1988 Constitution, the first democratically promulgated constitution in 
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worldviews shared with other indigenous peoples.”83 Such an approach 
is reinforced by the successful assertion by representatives from Africa 
and Asia of their status as indigenous in the negotiations leading up to 
the adoption of the Declaration and by the recognition of reconstituted 
Indian tribes in Brazil.
Firstness in time and place is less important than the common 
conditions of people who consider themselves to be indigenous and claim 
rights as such. Although a common reaction when discussing this issue 
is incredulity that a legal document could lack a definitional section, 
upon further reflection, it becomes apparent that a lack of definition can 
serve as a suture, an impetus for common struggle. Further, the success 
of peoples currently self-identifying as indigenous, in being accepted by 
the international community, should be more fully incorporated into 
anthropological analyses of identity formation, especially as this success 
is connected to supranational and state entities and practices. In fact, 
the decision to exclude a definition from the Declaration brings that 
document closer to an anthropological perspective on cultural practices 
and identity formation.84 Working to understand how particular 
indigenous peoples incorporate their new global indigenous identity will 
enhance both international legal and anthropological scholarship and 
allow those whose interests are most at stake to be given opportunities 
to participate in definitional discussions tied to rights and resources.  
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